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INDUSTRIAL MARKETING THROUGH LEASING DEVICES:
A SURVEY OF ANTITRUST PROBLEMS
The rapidly increasing use of leasing as a marketing device in the
post war years and the coincident increase in the number of anitrust pro-
ceedings which have resulted in decrees restricting this method of dis-
tribution have raised an important problem as to striking a balance be-
tween what appears to be desirable advancement in the marketing field
and the interests of the economy as a whole as these interests are con-
ceived in the antitrust laws. The most notable and apparently most per-
manent increase in leasing has appeared in industrial and production
equipment markets. Undoubtedly, it is the nature of the industries in
these markets, which are generally more or less oligopolistic, which has
been the background for most of the antitrust activity; but the vigor
with which sanctions have been applied against company leasing policies
warrants examination of both the propriety and utility of such restric-
tions. This examination will require the formulation of generalizations
regarding restrictions of leasing, which must be made with perhaps in-
sufficient regard for the individual case; a survey of reasons for the in-
creased use of leasing as a marketing device in the industrial equipment
and production fields; and finally, a determination as to the areas of
actual and potential conflict as well as competitive consequences of this
type of remedy.
Both lease provisions and business policies relating to a system of
leasing have been subjected to antitrust proscription through a variety of
channels.' Presently they are subject to attack under section three of the
1. The earliest cases stemmed from the statutory patent monopoly and the use of
tying agreements. Heaton-Pennisular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77
Fed. 288 (6th Cir. 1896) held that a sale of a patented shoe button-fastening machine
conditioned upon the exclusive use of the vendor's unpatented shoe buttons so as to give
the latter a monopoly on the manufacture and sale of buttons was not in restraint of
trade or against public policy, but was a protected exercise of the patent monopoly. This
misconstruction of the patent law was corrected, without reference to the Sherman Act
or to the Clayton Act, section three of which had been prompted by the Heaton-
Penninsular case, in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S.
502 (1917). The patentee in that case had licensed a manufacturer to produce and sell
motion picture machines imbodying his invention upon a covenant that the vendor's pur-
chasers or the latters' lessees should use only certain films, which were controlled by
the patentee, upon such terms as the patentee should impose. The Court broadly held:
"What ever the right of the owner may be to control by restriction the materials to be
used in operating the machine, it must be a right derived through the general law from
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Clayton Act,' relating to tying agreements, as contracts in restraint of
trade under section one of the Sherman Act' and as a method of monopo-
lizing or attempting to monopolize under section two of the Sherman Act.4
Leasing agreements which have been successfully attacked under
section three of the Clayton Act fall into three groups-the formal writ-
ten tying clauses, strict specifications for supplies and materials used
with a leased machine and informal tying policies. The first group in-
cludes a wide variety of provisions designed to: (a) require that other
machinery be purchased or leased from the lessor or that the lessee not
use machinery provided by the lessor's competitors ;' (b) extract a royalty
payment for the use of machinery or material not obtained from the les-
sor ;o (c) require the lessee to purchase supplies or materials, used in or in
the ownership of the property in the machine, and it cannot be derived from or pro-
tected by the patent law, which allows a grant only of the right to an exclusive use of
the new and useful discovery which has been made." Id. at 419. Thus the question of
legality of tying agreements was at the same time divorced from the patent law and
left for determination solely under the general law including the Clayton Act.
2. "That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, mer-
chandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for
use, consumption or resale within the United States . . .or fix a price charged there-
for, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement or under-
standing that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares,
merchandise, machinery, supplies or commodities of a competitor or competitors of the
lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such con-
dition may be to substantially lessen competition in any line of commerce." 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 14.
3. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal: . . . ." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1.
4. "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor. . . . " 15 U.S.C.A. § 2.
5. "Prohibitive clause" providing that the particular machine leased should not be
used in the preparation or manufacture of shoes upon which any work is done with any
machine not held under a lease from the lessor. United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United
States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922). "Exclusive use" clause requiring the lessee of particular
machinery to use exclusively machines of the lessor to perform the same kind of work
as that performed by the machines leased. Id. "Additional machines" clause providing
that if lessee has more work than can be performed by the machine leased, he must
lease additional machinery from the lessor to perform the work. Id. Clause providing
that lessee shall only use machinery leased on shoes which have had certain other opera-
tions performed upon them by the lessor's machines. Id. Grant of lease of peach pit-
ters upon condition that other machinery be purchased or leased. United States v. Food
Machinery & Chemical Corporation, 1954 Trade Cas. II 67,829 (N.D. Cal. 1954). Lessee
required not to use any vending machines other than those of the lessor for the duration
of the term and for five years thereafter. Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC,
194 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1952). Requirement that lessee not sell any products which were
not distributed through the leased vending machines. Id.
6. Leases of graining plates imposed penalty royalty on lessees using graining
materials obtained from lessor's competitors. Oxford Varnish Corp. v. Ault & Wiborg
Corp., 83 F.2d 764 (6th Cir. 1936). Clause requiring lessee to pay a royalty on shoes
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conjunction with the leased equipment, which may be the primary product
or a side line of the lessor;' (d) require the lessee to purchase all repair
and replacement parts for the leased machinery or equipment from the
lessor. Specifications for materials and equipment to be used in con-
nection with leased machinery are unobjectionable when reasonably cal-
culated to make the machinery more productive, efficient or longer
lived8 but it is not clear that a lessor may require that the lessee use ma-
tcrials or equipment equal in quality to that which the lessor can furnish
where such specifications are not shown to be necessary to the proper
functioning of the leased machine.' Prevailing practice in the can indus-
try prior to 1949 best illustrates the informal tying system which section
three of the Clayton Act condemns. Lessors as a matter of business
policy leased can closing machines only to lessees who agreed to purchase
cans under a requirements contract the term of which was identical to
the machinery lease. This practice led to a decree against the major can
companies in which the section three remedy included prohibition of any
lease of machines upon a condition or understanding that the lessee pur-
chase only the lessor's cans, or that he purchase a specified quota or
amount of cans, prohibition of the lessor's conditioning the availability
of machinery or renewal of leases upon such grounds, and prohibition
against the lessor's altering machinery or cans so that the machinery or
cans of other manufacturers cannot be used with the machinery or cans
of the lessor, unless for reasons of progress or efficiency."
operated on by machines procured from lessor's competitors. United Shoe Machinery
Corp. v. United States, supra, note 5. Clause providing lower royalty for lessees who
agree not to use certain machinery on shoes lasted on machines other than those leased
from the lessor. Id.
7. Requirement that lessee purchase shot buttons used in conjunction with leased
shoe machinery exclusively from the lessor. United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United
States, supra, note 5. Lessee of wire strapping packaging machines required to purchase
all wire strapping used in the machines from the lessor. Signode Steel Strapping Co.
v. FTC, 132 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1942). Lessee of riveting machines required to purchase
all rivets used in them from the lessor. Judson L. Thompson Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 150
F.2d 952 (1st Cir. 1945). Punching machines, sorters, and tabulators leased upon con-
dition that the lessee use lessor's punch cards exclusively. International Business Ma-
chines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936). Provision in leases of machines for
industrial utilization of salt requiring that only salt purchased from the lessor be used
in them. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). Requirement
in leases of vending machines that lessee not distribute through the machines any prod-
ucts not purchased from the lessor. Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, supa,
note 5. Requirement in leases of graining plates that lessees purchase graining ma-
terials used with them exclusively from lessor. Oxford Varnish Corp. v. Ault & Wi-
borg Corp., supra, note 6.
S. Stanley Co. of America v. American Telephone & Tel. Co., 4 F. Supp. 80
(D. Del. 1933).
9. See International Salt Co. v. United States, supra, note 7.
10. See United States v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1949),
final order, 1950 Trade Cas. 1 62,679. See also United States v. American Linen Sup-
ply Co., 1956 Trade Cas. ff 68,542 (N.D. Ill. 1956).
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Two kinds of arguments have been advanced in cases where leasing
practices fell within one of the described situations. The first has been
aimed at limiting the meaning or applicability of the terms of section
three by means of justification in sound business policy or legal theory,
with the ultimate purpose of creating judicial exceptions to the proscribed
activity. The second has been intended to define the concept of tendency
to substantially lessen competition so as to make tying practices unobjec-
tionable in certain industries or when practiced by certain individuals.
Arguments of the first kind have been generally unsuccessful. The
contention that a tying clause is permissible when the lessor has patents
on both the leased machinery and the tied product which give it a monop-
oly on both has been refuted." It has been argued without avail that the
purpose of the tying agreement was to maintain the lessor's good will
where the use of inferior goods or supplies with the leased machinery
might interfere with the successful performance of the machine.' 2 The
position has been taken by some lessors who rent inexpensive machinery,
which is easily purchasable on the market at nominal rates, with tying
provisions that only the primary product of the lessor be used in conjunc-
tion with them that they were merely furnishing a service to their cus-
tomers, i.e., using the rentals as a sales device. With one exception, it
has been rejected on the ground that the practical effect was the same as
with any other tying agreement." Substantiation of claims that the
leased machinery operated more efficiently when used with the lessor's
product will not alone justify a tying agreement unless it is further
shown that competitors are not capable of producing a satisfactory prod-
uct.' 4 It has been argued unsuccessfully that where the lease contract
provides for a nominal rental and an exclusive territory for the lessee, it
destroys mutuality and thereby deprives lessees of valuable contract rights
when they have not been made a party to the proceeding to enjoin en-
forcement of clauses requiring the lessees to use the lessor's machines
exclusively and to purchase all merchandise used with the leased ma-
chinery from the lessor.'" Finally, the contention that the lessor exer-
11. Stanley Co. of America v. American Telephone & Tel. Co., supra, note 8.
12. International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
See Stanley Co. of America v. American Telephone & Tel. Co., 4 F. Supp. 80 (D.
Del. 1933) where the court struck down strict specifications for sound records used
with its reproducing machinery but admitted that these requirements might have been
reasonable in the early years of the industry to build the patentee's good will.
13. Judson L. Thompson Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 952 (1st Cir. 1945) ; Signode
Steel Strapping Co. v. FTC, 132 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1942). For the exception see FTC v.
Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923).
14. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Judson L.
Thompson Mfg. Co. v. FTC, supra, note 13.
15. 78 F. Supp. 850, 854 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
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cised such strict control and complete domination over its lessees that
they were in fact employees and that the rule of Standard Oil of Cali-
fornia and Standard Stations, Inc. v. United States" to the effect that
restrictive agreements with wholly owned distributing corporations are
not prohibited should be applied has been rejected with the statement
that the lessor chose the lease form and must accept its consequences."
On the other hand, it has been successfully argued that a provision
requiring the lessee to obtain from the lessor exclusively at its regular
prices all duplicate parts, mechanisms and repairs is reasonable where all
parts of the leased machines are very delicate and, unless perfectly ad-
justed, will seriously impair proper operation and thus is not violative of
section three.1 " Also, it may be the law that where the leased equipment
is used in connection with the sale by the lessee of the lessor's product, a
clause requiring that only the lessor's product be sold in connection with
the lessor's equipment is not within the proscription of section three
where the contrary practice might result in a fraud upon the public.19
As to interpretation of the standard of tendency to substantially les-
sen competition, it is clear that the fact that the lessor offers its customers
an alternative form of lease which does not contain objectionable re-
strictions is irrelevant." Likewise, provisions that if any competitor of
the lessor offers the tied product to the lessee at a lower price than the
lessor charged, the lessee was free to purchase unless the lessor met the
price, or that the lessee was entitled to any general reduction in the price
of the tied product will not validate tying agreements which otherwise
fall within the section three standard.2 Beyond this, the section is not
interpreted as requiring proof that competition has actually diminished;22
but neither does it operate where there is a "mere possibility" of a sub-
stantial lessening of competition ;23 there must be a probability that com-
petition will be substantially lessened. 4 A substantial lessening of com-
petition is interpreted to mean the foreclosure of competition in a sub-
16. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 194 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1952).
17. United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd
per curiam, 343 U.S. 922 (1952).
18. United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
19. See Signode Steel Strapping Co. v. FTC, 132 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1942) where
the court comments upon FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923).
20. United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, supra, note 18.
21. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
22. Standard Oil of California and Standard Stations, Inc. v. United States, 337
U.S. 293 (1949).
23. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922).
24. Ibid.
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stantial share of the line of commerce affected. 2' Domination of the
market for the tying product is generally considered sufficient in itself
to support an inference of such foreclosure.26 Proof that a substantial
volume of commerce in the tied product is restrained may also amount
to such a foreclosure It has also been established that whenever a les-
sor seeks by means of a tying agreement to extend a patent monopoly
over the leased product to a monopoly of the market in unpatented sup-
plies or materials and succeeds in doing this, he has substantially lessened
competition in the latter line of commerce on the theory that the patent
on the tying product gives a hold upon that market.28
Various lease provisions have been condemned as contracts in re-
straint of trade under section one of the Sherman Act.2" Also certain
policies relating to the conduct of leasing systems have been condemned
as furthering combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade under
this section.3" Under section two, lease provisions and policies relating
to a leasing system have likewise been condemned-as a principal instru-
ment of monopolization, and one which is relatively easy to cope with
by judicial remedy.31 Frequently a leasing system is vigorously attacked
on the basis of both sections without precise application of the elements
of the act to the various remedial measures.2
Once a violation of section one or section two can be made out in
terms of the existence of a restraint of trade or monopolization and a
leasing system is found to be a significant factor in accomplishing the
illegality, the lessor will invariably be required to embark upon a policy
of offering to sell the product, as well as lease it, to all comers and upon
25. Standard Oil of California and Standard Stations, Inc. v. United States, 337
U.S. 293 (1949) ; International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (fore-
closure of competitors from any substantial market unreasonable per se).
26. International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936);
United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922) ; United States v.
American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1949). See also Times-Picayune Pub.
Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
27. Oxford Varnish Corp. v. Ault & Wiborg Corp., 83 F.2d 764 (6th Cir. 1936).
See also Signode Steel Strapping Co. v. FTC, 132 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1942); Times-
Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
28. Oxford Varnish Corp. v. Ault & Wiborg Corp., supra, note 27.
29. E.g., United States v. Crown-Zellarbach Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. U 68,544
(N.D. 11. 1956) (tying agreement).
30. E.g., United States v. American Linen Supply Co., 1956 Trade Cas. II 68,542
(N.D. Ill. 1956) (required to offer to sell the product).
31. E.g., United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1953) ; United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 1956 Trade Cas.
U 68,245 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
32. E.g., United States v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
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substantially the same terms, if he has not previously done so." His
lessees may automatically be given an option to purchase machinery al-
ready held under lease at terms at least as favorable or advantageous
economically as the lease terms ;34 and all future leases may be required to
include an option to purchase as well." Characteristically there is a re-
quirement that the lessor keep adequate supplies of repair parts on hand
for purchasers of its machinery as well as for lessees, that it not dis-
criminate against purchasers in providing maintenance and other services
(including information) and that it charge lessees separately for repairs
and maintenance and provide these to purchasers at substantially the same
rates." In a section two or monopolization case the lessor may be en-
joined from acquiring any used machines owned by others except for ex-
perimental purposes, or perhaps as trade-ins or credit against sums owed,
and then only in limited amounts; and may be required to rid itself of all
used machinery on hand.3
Major alterations of lease provisions also frequently result when a
case is made out under both sections one and two of the Sherman Act.
The period of outstanding leases has typically been severely reduced, and
the maximum period of future leases restricted to one year, or somewhat
longer if a provision for cancellation on short notice after one year is
included. Further the lessee has been provided with a one year renewal
or successive one year renewals upon expiration of any lease, with pro-
33. United States v. American Linen Supply Co., 1956 Trade Cas. 1 68,542 (N.D.
Ill. 1956) (consent decree under § 1 Sherman Act) (must offer to sell after one year
from date of decree) ; United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 1956
Trade Cas. 68,245 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) ; United States v. Food Machinery & Chemical
Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. ff 67,829 (N.D. Cal. 1954) (required to offer to sell any existing
type peach pitters available); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F.
Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953); United States v. American Can Co., 1950-1951 Trade
Cas. ff 62,679 (N.D. Cal. 1950) (final judgment) (requirement of offer to sell expires
after ten years). In the I.B.M. case, supra, the court additionally required that defend-
ant must afford its sales representatives compensation for sales of machines equivalent
to that for leases of machines.
34. United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. 1
68,245 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) ; United States v. American Linen Supply Co., 1956 Trade Cas.
ff 68,542 (N.D. Cal. 1956) (consent decree under § 1 Sherman Act); United States v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953).
35. United States v. American Can Co., 1950-1951 Trade Cas. ff 62,679 (N.D. Cal.
1950) (required to sell to any lessee upon application for 10 year period).
36. United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 1956 Trade Cas.
ff 68,245 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); United States v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 1954
Trade Cas. 1 67,829 (N.D. Cal. 1954) ; United States v. Scott & Williams, Inc., 1954
Trade Cas. ff 67,748 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., Inc.,
(D.R.I. 1954); United States v. American Can Co., 1950-1951 Trade Cas. 1 62,679
(N.D. Cal. 1950).
37. United States v. International Business Machines Corp., supra, note 36; United
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953).
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vision for cancellation on short notice;"S the only exception to these pro-
visions being that new types and models of machinery are granted a
longer initial leasing period, usually from three to five years." The les-
sor is not permitted to provide machinery without cost or below cost,
i.e., rental rates must be compensatory ;4 further, machinery may not be
leased at discriminatory prices for the purpose of destroying competitors
or competition.4 The lessor cannot by the terms of the lease prohibit or
control experimentation, alteration, or use of attachments or auxiliary
equipment with leased machinery except to assure that the machinery is
left in good order at the termination of the lease.42 Tying clauses of the
kind dealt with under section three of the Clayton Act have also been
eliminated under sections one and two of the Sherman Act. Thus, the
lessor may not provide machinery on the condition that the lessee pur-
chase or use other machinery furnished by the lessor or anyone else,42
or that the lessee not purchase or use other machinery not furnished by
the lessor or anyone else,4" or that he purchase any materials or supplies
from the lessor or anyone else.4" Finally the lessor will not be permitted
to incorporate substantial return charges in machinery leases,4 or re-
quire disclosure of the use to which the machine will be put by the lessee,17
and will be required to separate rental charges from servicing charges.4"
As regards the requirements of restraint of trade under section one
and monopolization under section two it is sufficient for these purposes
38. United States v. International Cigar Machinery Co., 1956 Trade Cas. ff 68,426
(S.D.N.Y. 1956); United States v. International Business Machines Corp., supra, note
36; United States v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 1954 Trade Cas. 67,829 (N.D.
Cal. 1954); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., su~pra, note 37. But see
United States v. American Can Co., 1950-1951 Trade Cas. 1 62,679 (N.D. Cal. 1950)
where no limitation was placed on the lease period but lessees were given automatic op-
tions to renew for one year and the end of term could not occur within three months of
the end of the term of a requirements contract, upon which a time limitation was placed.
39. United States v. International Cigar Machinery Co., supra, note 38; United
States v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., supra, note 38.
40. United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., Inc., 1954 Trade Cas. 1 67,828
(D.R.I. 1954) ; United States v. American Can Co., supra, note 38.
41. United States v. Scott & Williams, Inc., 1954 Trade Cas. 1 67,748 (S.D.N.Y.
1954).
42. United States v. International Cigar Machinery Co., 1956 Trade Cas. 1 68,426
(S.D.N.Y. 1956); United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 1956 Trade
Cas. 1 68,245 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
43. United States v. Scott & Williams, Inc., 1954 Trade Cas. ff 67,748 (S.D.N.Y.
1954) ; United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., Inc., 1954 Trade Cas. ff 67,828 (D.R.L
1954).
44. United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., Inc., supra, note 43.
45. See cases cited, supra, note 43.
46. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953).




to say that under United States v. Hartford-Empire Co.4" and United
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 0 if certain features of a leasing
system are thought to be principal factors creating the situation which
exists in violation of sections one and two, these key features will be
eliminated.
The reasoning underlying the increasing use of the lease as a mar-
keting device in industrial situations where it has not been traditional is
for the most part persuasive. It may be summarized as follows."' Pro-
ducers in many industries believe that it facilitates the distribution of ex-
pensive productive equipment such as machine tools, i.e., customers are
beginning to demand a leasing plan for the purposes of freeing their own
working capital, taxation, experimentation with new machinery, and
other real or supposed advantages."2 The complex nature of his product,
may impel the seller to take full responsibility for its service and mainte-
nance in order to protect his brand name. When leasing becomes a major
marketing tool of a firm, or an entire industry, the stability and pre-
dictability which is injected into the market can promote efficiency and
make profits greater-distribution can be kept up even in down phases
of the business cycle because the buyer is not required to commit himself
to large scale investments. Thus, long range planning can be accurate
and, in the short run, production of the leased product can be kept level.
It is contended that as an ultimate result, the existence of excess capacity
in an industry can be almost entirely eliminated."
Credit risks are reduced in that the legal difficulties involved in the
repossession of goods purchased outright, when the buyer defaults, are
minimized; the seller can more readily afford to risk distribution to
buyers whose credit strength would not meet minimum standards for
purchase; and, finally, the seller avoids the loss of equipment as legal
liability to other creditors of the buyer which might otherwise occur in
some states-especially where the equipment must be bolted to the floor
or in some other way becomes attached to the realty. It is also thought
that the close associations between buyer and seller developed in a leasing
situation may open the way to more ready distribution of other products
in the line, which often are sold outright. Since supplies of particular
49. 46 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ohio 1942).
50. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953).
51. See generally, Griesinger, Pros and Cons of Leasing Equipment, HARv. Bus.
REv.; March 1955, p. 75.
52. See note 54, infra.
53. The past earnings records of International Business Machines Corp. and United
Shoe Machinery Corp. tend to support this conclusion but of course the existence of
high and level earnings, efficiency and lack of excess capacity might be attributable to
other factors in those particular industries.
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specifications may be essential in many instances for the proper function-
ing of the leased product, the seller is also in an especially good position
to peddle his line of supplies to the lessee. Finally, leasing has legitimate
advantages in that the regular return of used equipment provides sales
leads, aids in research and development of better products and allows the
seller, by reconditioning and selling where economical, to reach a low
price market in which he might not otherwise be able to compete.
From the buyers' standpoint, the desire to obtain equipment with-
out depleting working capital is probably the most important motive be-
hind a leasing agreement."4 Another important consideration is that
leasing industrial equipment may help the manufacturer to avert losses
resulting from the rapid obsolescence to which machine tools are subject '
and enable him to maintain the most modern plant facilities available if
the terms of the lease are sufficiently flexible to permit substitution by
the lessee. 6 It is also felt that tax savings may be forthcoming since
expenditures for leased facilities are fully deductible whereas deprecia-
tion chargeable may be insufficient, particularly when a buyer will have
only a limited period of use of a machine and will have to dispose of it
before it has been fully depreciated. " Also cited as advantages, have
been that modern equipment is more readily available for a venture con-
taining an element of gambling which would not be undertaken if the
equipment had to be purchased and that the buyer is relieved of the bur-
den of servicing equipment which he frequently cannot obtain in the
quality that the seller can provide." It should be added that once a seller,
whether a producer or not, makes a decision to lease his product, he may
have a strong incentive to require that he be permitted to service the
leased item in order to make routine inspection and prompt repairs and
thus get the maximum useful life from it. 9
From these summarizations of antitrust restriction of leasing prac-
tices and the reasons for use of leasing in industrial marketing, it is ap-
parent that unless extreme care is used in framing antitrust restrictions,
54. See statement by D. Power Boothe, Jr., president of U.S. Leasing Corp.,
Equipizent Leasing: What's Behind it?, BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 23, 1954, p. 41.
55. Today's machine tools are almost twice as productive as comparable ones pro-
duced in 1940. Goodman, Purchase or Lease? PURCHASING, July 1956, pp. 122-23.
56. Such flexibility will obtain if the lease is for a relatively short term, can be
easily avoided or provides for substitution of newly developed machinery. See Good-
man, supra, note 55. See also White, Economics of Equipment Leasing: Types of Leas-
ing Arrangements and Pros and Cons, 25 CONTROLLER 332.
57. Equipment Leasing: What's Behind It?, BusINEss WEEK, Sept. 23, 1954, p. 41.
58. White, Economics of Equipment Leasing: Types of Leasing Arrangements and
Pros and Cons, 25 CONTROLLER 332.
59. An example is the leasing of tires by manufacturers to bus lines. Regular in-
spection and repair has considerably increased tire life.
NOTES
legitimate use of the device may be hindered. In terms of the rationale
behind a leasing system conflicts may arise in at least four areas.6" First,
the advantage of lower initial and yearly costs to the lessee which has
been influential in the development of leasing systems tends to be offset
by antitrust restrictions which permit a lease to extend only for short
terms without return charges."' Such restrictions may lead to increased
lease charges since the entire risk of obsolescence is placed upon the les-
sor, and more particularly are likely to lead to abnormally high but de-
clining charges, which is detrimental from the standpoint of new en-
trants. It should be noted, however, that since one of the reasons given
for preference of the system is the protection from obsolescence, 2 pre-
sumably many lessees are willing to pay higher rentals for the benefits of
a short term lease. Also, the provision of a recent decree63 that the les-
sor may not require the lessee to permit him to make regular inspection
and repairs may tend to increase rentals since the lessor cannot be assured
of getting maximum life from his equipment. Finally, the requirement
that the lessor must offer to sell upon terms economically equivalent to
those at which he leases is alleged to have a tendency to keep rental prices
at a higher level than they would otherwise be, at least in the shoe ma-
chinery industry ;64 even though such a requirement is not generally in-
terpreted to mean that the equivalency must be such that one half of the
firm's customers are buyers.6 5
The second advantage of leasing which may be thwarted by insensi-
tive antitrust restriction is that of stabilization of production and in-
come. It is apparent that this advantage is derived only in proportion to
the extent of the firm's distribution which is accomplished through leas-
ing. It seems equally apparent that a requirement that the lessor offer
to sell upon terms equivalent to those at which leases are concluded is a
threat to any stabilization which might be achieved through exclusive or
even extensive leasing. The severe reduction of the duration of leases
and prohibition of return charges may also adversely affect the firm's
attempt at income and production stabilization although this is less clear
60. As far as Clayton Act violations are concerned it is difficult to perceive that
any legitimate private or public interest is injured by rigorous enforcement. The typi-
cal tying provision is calculated to exploit the firm's superior competitive position in one
line of commerce by unnaturally extending it into another. The firm gains nothing
but undeserved profits and the public loses by an economically unjustified foreclosure
of the market in the latter line of commerce.
61. See cases cited note 38, supra.
62. See note 56, supra.
63. United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 1956 Trade Cas.
9I 68,426 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
64. 2 WHITNEY, ANTITRUST POLICIES 132.
65. Id. at 133.
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since by charging high but declining rentals and regular introduction of
returned equipment into a second-hand market the firm may be able to
offset the need for long terms and return charges. Of course a second-
hand market will be competitive with the lessor's new product market and
will affect the profitability of leasing but there should be no effect upon
the stability of the individual firm's operations in so far as it derives
from leases themselves, i.e., their duration and the willingness of buyers
to accept them at times when they would be unwilling to incur the risk of
outright purchase.
Thirdly, the advantage of a leasing system that the manufacturer-
lessor is able to keep in touch with the user of the product, to know his
problems, and to carry on the most effective research and development
program, which has been strikingly pointed out in a few cases," could be
affected or eliminated by the requirements that the lessor offer to sell his
product or that he allow maintenance and repairs to be obtained from
other sources. It should be noted that no decree has ever required a
defendant to refrain from leasing or to sell at better terms than those at
which he leases or to refrain from offering maintenance and repairs al-
though such restrictions have been contended for.66 Thus, it seems evi-
dent that so long as restrictions do not prevent a manufacturer from
leasing and providing maintenance and repairs to a representative sec-
tion of his customers, he will be able to gain the same information and
understanding from this group as he could from his entire market. As
far as the advantage of "close associations" with the customer which
lead the way to other dealings is concerned, it is doubtful that such an
advantage deserves protection in the oligopolistic types of markets in
which leasing restrictions have generally occurred. Thus, it must be con-
cluded that advantages which derive from the lessor's ability to "keep in
touch" are not impinged by current types of restrictions.
The fourth advantage of leasing relates to the situation where the
complex nature of the product makes it desirable that the lessor take full
responsibility for its service and maintenance. This advantage may be
annihilated by the requirement that the lessor not demand that he be al-
lowed to service the leased product. This requirement is harsh both in
this regard and from the standpoint of increased costs mentioned above
and should only be invoked in the most serious cases of monopolization.
It is arguable that any antitrust restriction which makes inroads up-
on* marketing devices and policies which are otherwise legitimate and
founded upon sound analysis of business conditions is unwarranted; and
66. See United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953).
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therefore, that only those distribution methods which in themselves con-
stitute Clayton Act violations or contracts in restraint of trade should be
proscribed under the antitrust laws. For this position, it may be further
argued that to impose restrictions upon a leasing system as a remedial
measure for Sherman Act problems stemming from sources other than
the system itself is to invoke a remedy whose effectiveness is uncertain
at best and that such problems are properly handled by divestiture, dis-
solution or public regulation.
This argument has force, but, unfortunately the problem of fashion-
ing suitable remedies in non-competitive industrial situations is not an
easy one. Neither the government and courts nor the public are yet per-
suaded that drastic remedies are called for in these situations; further,
this survey shows little evidence that business has been unfairly or arbi-
trarily deprived of the advantages of the leasing device in those cases
where it has been restricted as a part of the overall remedial scheme for
Sherman Act violations. Thus, until better methods of establishing com-
petitive industrial conditions are devised it will be necessary for those
who fashion decrees to retain an acute awareness of the delicate balance
which must be achieved if industrial marketers and their lessees are to
obtain the economic advantages of leasing.
USE OF SUBNORMAL MENTALITY TO DISCREDIT
Any witness is competent to give testimony who possesses minimum
powers of observation, recollection and narration.' The liberal eviden-
tiary rules prescribing what this minimum shall be, however, permit the
introduction of many witnesses whose powers of observation, recollec-
tion and narration2 are far below normal.3  For example, challenges to
competency have failed to bar testimony by an inmate of a home for
feeble-minded,4 by an epileptic girl with immature mental development,5
and by a seriously insane inmate in a mental hospital.6 Because evidence
of mental deficiency in competency hearings is not considered by the
1. 2 WIGmo,0E, EVIDENCE § 478 (3d ed. 1940).
2. The ability to communicate is seldom a problem necessitating the use of experts
since poor speaking or hearing abilities can be detected by a lay jury easily.
3. State v. Wildman, 145 Ohio 379, 61 N.E.2d 790 (1945).
4. People v. Lambersky, 410 Ill. 451, 102 N.E.2d 326 (1951).
5. State v. Williams, 111 Utah 379, 180 P.2d 551 (1947).
6. District of Columbia v. Arms, 107 U.S. 519 (1883).
